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Privacy, Sharing, and Trust:  
The Facebook Study 
Ari Ezra Waldman† 
Abstract 
 Using sharing on Facebook as a case study, this Article presents 
empirical evidence suggesting that trust is a significant factor in in-
dividuals’ willingness to share personal information on online social net-
works. I then make two arguments, one that explains why Facebook is 
designed the way it is and one that calls for legal protection against 
unfair manipulation of users. I argue that Facebook is built on trust: 
the trust that exists between friends and the trust that exists between 
users and the platform. In particular, I describe how Facebook designs 
its platform and interface to leverage the trust we have in our friends 
to nudge us to share. Sometimes, that helps create a dynamic social 
environment: knowing what our friends are doing helps us determine 
when it is safe to interact. Other times, Facebook leverages trust to 
manipulate us into sharing information with advertisers. This should 
give us pause. Because Facebook uses trust-based design, users may be 
confused about the privacy effects of their behavior. Federal and state 
consumer and privacy protection regulators should step in. 
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Introduction 
Online social networks present a privacy puzzle. Scholars have 
shown that between 2005 and 2011, both total sharing on Facebook and 
privacy-seeking behavior on the platform increased.1 That means that 
Facebook users were sharing much personal information even as they 
were changing their privacy settings to ostensibly make their data more 
secure. It seems counterintuitive: if we are concerned that Facebook 
does not protect our privacy, we should share less, not more.2 This is a 
particularly jarring contradiction given that Facebook’s voracious 
appetite for data is not sated by the information we actively disclose; 
it also sweeps in data from our clicks, third-party apps, internet 
browsing behavior, and our interactions with its partners and 
advertisers. 
So how can we explain our sharing behavior? Several studies have 
suggested that people make their disclosure decisions based on a variety 
of factors, including whether others have disclosed,3 the order of 
 
1. Fred Stuntzman, Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The 
Evolution of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. Privacy & 
Confidentiality 7, 8–9 (2012). 
2. Professor James Grimmelmann noted the same mystery seven years ago. See 
James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1137, 1151 (2009) 
(suggesting that social motivations explain why Facebook users share 
personal information, regardless of its privacy risks). 
3. See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, The Impact 
of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 49 J. Marketing Res. 
160, 172 (2012) (“[P]eople’s decisions to disclose sensitive information are 
comparative in nature.”). 
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questions,4 website design and aesthetics,5 and social motivations,6 to 
name just a few. James Grimmelmann has argued that because social 
networking sites are platforms for executing essential human social 
needs, it is Facebook’s design that nudges us to disclose.7 This Article 
builds on this work, arguing that Facebook encourages us to share 
personal information by designing its platform to cue trust among its 
members. 
In 2013, Facebook asked its users: “How trustworthy is Facebook 
overall?” A spokesperson explained that Facebook was just looking for 
feedback to improve service and enhance user experiences.8 But there is 
likely much more to it. We know that Facebook is an inherently social 
tool designed to create, foster, and expand social interaction.9 We also 
know that Facebook routinely tinkers with its user interface to inspire 
user trust and, in turn, sharing. Its committee of Trust Engineers, for 
example, plays with wording, multiple choice options, the order of 
questions, designs, and other tools to encourage users to honestly report 
what they do not like about posts they want taken down.10 That may 
be an important goal, but it shows that Facebook is well aware that 
trust and sharing are linked. 
This Article begins where Facebook left off, seeking to fill a gap in 
the legal and social science literature on what motivates people to share 
personal information online and when regulators should step in to 
protect individuals from manipulation. Based on previous studies on 
Facebook’s design and using primary empirical research of Facebook 
users, this Article shows that we share when we trust. In particular, it 
is the trust we have in others—what sociologists call particular social 
trust—that encourages us to share on Facebook. Higher levels of trust 
in the platform and higher levels of trust in those individuals in our 
 
4. Id. 
5. Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loewenstein, Strangers on a 
Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 
J. Consumer Res. 858, 864 (2011). 
6. Pedro Giovanni Leon et al., What Matters to Users? Factors that Affect 
Users’ Willingness to Share Information with Online Advertisers, Symp. on 
Usable Privacy and Security 9 (2013). 
7. Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1151. 
8. Brian Fung, Facebook Wants to Know If You Trust It. But It’s Keeping All 
the Answers to Itself, Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/31/facebook-wants-to-
know-if-you-trust-it-but-its-keeping-all-the-answers-to-itself [https://perma.cc 
/F9WN-E74S]. 
9. Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1156. 
10. The Trust Engineers, RadioLab (Feb. 09, 2015, 8:01 PM), http://www. 
radiolab.org/story/trust-engineers/ [https://perma.cc/NPZ5-BSRY]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
Privacy, Sharing, and Trust 
196 
networks are associated with a higher propensity to share personal 
information. 
Facebook knows this and it has designed its platform to benefit 
from it.11 Among many other tactics, Facebook prefaces both social 
posts and native advertisements with information on how one’s friends 
and other users have interacted with the content. In doing so, it not 
only creates the circumstances for social interaction with those we trust, 
it exploits the trust we have in our friends and families for financial 
gain by manipulating us into sharing information with third party 
advertisers, as well. Given how frequently users already confuse native 
advertisements with other content,12 Facebook’s design strategy to 
leverage trust to manipulate us into clicking on those advertisements 
should give us pause. Regulators should step in. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly summarizes the 
two literatures relevant to this study: users’ propensity to share per-
sonal information online and the sociology of trust. This Part argues 
that, to date, trust has played an underappreciated role in our under-
standing of sharing. Part II defines the methodology used for the 
research. Part III presents the results and reports on the statistically 
significant correlation between trust and the willingness to disclose. The 
results suggest that individuals tend to share personal or sensitive 
information in contexts of trust, with the expectation that their privacy 
will be protected. Part IV describes how this research is already 
reflected in Facebook’s News Feed and suggests that privacy lawyers 
and regulators have a role to play in protecting consumers from 
manipulation. 
I. Privacy and Trust 
There is a growing literature on the connection between privacy 
and trust.13 Several scholars, including James Grimmelmann, 
 
11. See Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1155 (describing Facebook’s features—
including adding contacts and “poking” other users—as mechanisms to build 
trust in the online platform). 
12. See, e.g., Bartosz W. Wojdynski & Nathaniel J. Evans, Going Native: 
Effects of Disclosure Position and Language on the Recognition and 
Evaluation of Online Native Advertising, 45 J. Advertising 157, 161 (2016) 
(finding, among other things, that only 17 of 242 subjects could distinguish 
between a native advertisement and a real news story). 
13. See, e.g., Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in 
Privacy Law, Stan. Tech. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 37–
40), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2655719 [https:// 
perma.cc/P724-5W5Q] (connecting confidentiality and trust); Ari Ezra 
Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked 
World, 69 U. Miami L. Rev. 559, 560 (2015) (arguing that disclosures in 
contexts of trust should be protected as private). 
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Alessandro Acquisti, and others, have conducted theoretical and em-
pirical studies into our motivations and sharing behavior on Facebook.14 
This Article brings these otherwise isolated literatures together and 
provides quantitative evidence that trust is an important factor in 
Facebook users’ decisions to share. The Article also shows that 
Facebook designs its platform to take advantage of this link. 
This Part describes the current state of research on trust and 
sharing. I address what social scientists mean by trust, hypothesize its 
connection to individuals’ propensity to disclose, briefly summarize the 
current social science literature on sharing, and show that trust in other 
people has been an underappreciated force in that research. I then bring 
together the social science and legal literatures to tease out the 
theoretical relationship between trust, sharing, and privacy. 
A. What Is Trust? 
Much of the work on trust,15 sharing, and privacy online focuses 
either on how protecting privacy can build trust16 or on how the per-
ception that a website can be trusted to protect user privacy can 
assuage the privacy risks perceived by consumers.17 Indeed, when the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the California Attorney 
General’s office recommend that online platforms be transparent about 
their privacy and data practices so as to inspire consumer trust,18 they  
14. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 2 (examining the social reasons people 
participate on social networking websites); Stuntzman, Gross & Acquisti, 
supra note 1 (documenting how social networking platforms have changed 
expectations of privacy and peoples’ willingness to disclose information). 
15. There are two types of trust in the social science literature: general and 
particular. Briefly, general social trust is the belief that most people can be 
trusted. For example, the question—“Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?’’—has been asked in the General Social Survey since 1972. Ken 
Newton & Sonja Zmerli, Three Forms of Trust and Their Association, 3 
Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev. 169, 177 (2011). Particular social trust is the trust we 
have in specific other people. Id. at 170–72. This last form of trust is the 
subject of this research. 
16. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 13, at 37–44 (considering the effects of 
certain factors, including confidentiality, discretion, transparency, honesty, 
and security in building trust in social networking platforms). 
17. See, e.g., David Gefen & Paul A. Pavlou, The Boundaries of Trust and Risk: 
The Quadratic Moderating Role of Institutional Structures, 23 Info. Sys. 
Res. 940 (2012) (discussing the impact that perceptions of confidentiality, 
security, and trust have on consumer practices). 
18. Kamala D. Harris, Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t. of Justice, Making Your 
Privacy Practices Public: Recommendations on Developing a 
Meaningful Privacy Policy 4 (2014); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Mobile 
Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency 3–4 
(2013). See also Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell 
Phones and Your Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Privacy, 
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are talking about the trust consumers have that those platforms will 
fulfill their data privacy promises and safeguard customer data.19 But 
on what bases do we learn to trust these websites? This Article contends 
that it has a lot to do with who else uses them. That is particularly 
true for online social networks. 
The trust we have in specific other people is called particular social 
trust, or a resource of social capital between or among two or more 
persons concerning the expectations that others will behave according 
to accepted norms.20 It is the “favourable expectation regarding other 
people’s actions and intentions,”21 or the belief that others will behave 
in a predictable manner. For example, if Alice asks Brady to hold her 
spare set of keys, she trusts that Brady will not break in and steal from 
her. When an individual speaks with relative strangers in a support 
group like Alcoholics Anonymous, she trusts that they will not divulge 
her secrets. Trust, therefore, includes a willingness to accept some risk 
and vulnerability toward others to grease the wheels of social activity.22 
If I never trusted, my social life would be paralyzed. As Niklas Luhmann 
 
Technology and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 90 
(2011) (statement of Alan Davidson, Director of Public Policy, Google Inc.) 
(“If we fail to offer clear, usable privacy controls, transparency in our privacy 
practices, and strong security, our users will simply switch to another 
provider. This is as true for our services that are available on mobile devices 
as it is for those that are available on desktop computers.”). 
19. See, e.g., Kirsten Martin, Understanding Privacy Online: Development of a 
Social Contract Approach to Privacy, 137 J. Bus. Ethics 551 (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2598963 [https:// 
perma.cc/9CK6-QTKU] (examining online privacy under a social contract 
approach). See also Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis & F. David 
Schoorman, An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, 20 Acad. 
Mgmt. Rev. 709 (1995) (proposing using a dyadic model of trust when 
studying trust in an organizational context); Michael Pirson, Kirsten 
Martin & Bidhan L. Parmar, Public Trust in Business and Its 
Determinants, in Public Trust in Business 116–53 (Jared D. Harris, 
Brian T. Moriarty & Andrew C. Wicks eds., 2014) (discussing the 
importance of trust in the business context). 
20. Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: 
Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 Am. J. Soc. 1320, 
1332 (1993). 
21. Guido Möllering, The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of 
Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension, 35 Sociology 403, 404 (2001). 
See also Newton and Zmerli, supra note 15, at 171 (noting that particular 
trust relates to trusting someone personally, as opposed to general trust which 
relates to generally trusting everyone); J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, 
Trust as a Social Reality, 63 Soc. Forces 967, 968 (1985) (describing 
expectations from others as the basis for trust among people). 
22. Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power 4 (1979) (presenting trust as a 
“necessity” for proper social conduct). 
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stated, trust exists where knowledge ends.23 It is the mutual 
“faithfulness” on which all social interaction depends.24 I cannot know 
for certain that my neighbor will not abuse her key privileges or that 
my fellow support group members will keep my confidences, so trust 
allows me to interact with and rely on them. And I earn all sorts of 
positive rewards as a result.25  
Lawyers should be familiar with particular social trust. It is, after 
all, at the core of the general notion of confidentiality and the more 
specific doctrines of privilege.26 As Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog 
have noted, “perhaps the most basic assumption people make when 
disclosing personal information,” whether to doctors, lovers, or ISPs, 
“is that the recipient will be discreet.”27 They note that we trust doctors 
“not to reveal information about our health and mental state” and trust 
lovers “not to kiss and tell.”28 Richards’s and Hartzog’s formulation of 
discretion, therefore, is based on trust, or the expectation that 
individuals will continue to behave according to accepted social norms. 
We expect doctors to keep our medical confidences and our lovers to 
keep our sexual confidence because doing so conforms to presiding 
norms. These expectations also justify privilege doctrines. Mutual trust 
and confidentiality are essential for attorney-client, doctor-patient, and 
spousal privileges29 because such norms encourage the kind of full and 
frank disclosure necessary for effective counsel, supportive care, and 
 
23. Id. at 33–34. See also Patricia M. Doney, Joseph P. Cannon & Michael R. 
Mullen, Understanding the Influence of National Culture on the 
Development of Trust, 23 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 601, 603 (1998) (explaining 
knowledge-based trust). 
24. See Waldman, supra note 13, at 602 (“[Trust is] essential to all social inter-
action, is at the heart of how we decide to share information about ourselves, 
and helps explain when we feel our privacy invaded.”). 
25. Trust helps us deal with uncertainty and complexity by allowing us to rely 
on the recommendations of others. See Talcott Parsons, Action Theory 
and the Human Condition 45–47 (1978) (explaining that trust, in the 
professional context, builds from feelings of integrity and competence). Plus, 
it encourages therapeutic sharing by giving all individuals, from alcoholics 
and those suffering from depression to close friends, the confidence they need 
to disclose personal and perhaps stigmatizing information. See, e.g., Aaron 
T. Beck & Brad A. Alford, Depression: Causes and Treatment 292–
324 (2d ed. 2009) (describing trust between a patient and therapist as integral 
to successful treatment). For a more in-depth discussion of the social benefits 
of particular social trust, see Waldman, Privacy as Trust, supra note 13, at 
605. 
26. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 13, at 37–41 (connecting confidentiality and 
trust). 
27. Id. at 38. 
28. Id. 
29. Richard A. Lord, 23 Williston on Contracts § 62:12 (4th ed. 2002). 
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love.30 And, according to several studies, we are deeply concerned that 
information we share with one website may be shared with third 
parties.31 Perhaps this concern stems from our inability, and lack of 
opportunity, to determine for ourselves whether we trust those third 
parties. 
B. Particular Social Trust and the Propensity to Disclose 
It makes sense, then, to turn to trust when thinking about what 
motivates us to share personal information online: Alice shares infor-
mation with Brady because Alice trusts Brady with that information; 
the applicable norms—confidentiality and discretion—give Alice the 
confidence and comfort to share with Brady, trusting that Brady will 
be discreet. Despite the intuitive appeal of that mechanism, particular 
social trust has been, at best, a silent undercurrent in a growing liter-
ature on our propensity to disclose personal information. 
For example, Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John, and George 
Loewenstein have found that disclosure behavior is based on com-
parative judgments32: if we perceive that others are willing to disclose, 
we are more likely to disclose;33 if we perceive that the information 
asked of us is particularly intrusive, we are less likely to disclose.34 
Acquisti and his colleagues asked individuals to respond to a series of 
ethics questions, some of which required them to admit to stigmatizing 
behavior. The individuals were more likely to respond that they had 
engaged in bad behaviors when told that previous respondents made 
similar admissions.35 Based on research that established a link between 
how professional a website looks and its security,36 Leslie John found 
 
30. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege “is to encourage full and frank com-
munication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader 
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice”). See 
also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (“The modern 
justification for this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its 
perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage 
relationship.”). 
31. Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in 
the Post-Snowden Era, Pew Research Center 3, 29 (2014), http:// 
www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_11121
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2SM-AQPX]. 
32. See Acquisti, John & Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 172 (“[P]eople’s 
decisions to disclose sensitive information are comparative in nature.”). 
33. Id. at 160, 165, 172. 
34. Id. at 160, 171–73. 
35. Id. at 165. 
36. See, e.g., Lorrie Faith Cranor, Web Privacy with P3P (2002) 
(discussing uniform internet code that will allow internet users to decide 
whether a website can collect information about the user’s browsing 
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that individuals’ are, perhaps counterintuitively, more willing to admit 
to bad behavior on unprofessional-looking websites.37 In other words, 
contextual cues within an unprofessional website interface caused 
people to suppress privacy concerns and increase disclosure.38 Other 
scholars have found that disclosure can be emotionally manipulated: 
positive emotional feelings about a website, inspired by website design, 
the type of information requested, and the presence of a privacy policy 
correlate with a higher willingness to disclose.39 Still others have found 
that knowledge of a website’s data use practices can influence disclosure 
behavior.40 
This literature teaches us, among other things, that our propensity 
to share is contextual. That context is partly influenced by the other 
individuals around us.41 That could mean that our propensity to disclose 
is subject to a herding effect: when we are around others who disclose, 
we disclose.42 Another possible explanation is that knowledge that 
others have admitted to stigmatizing behavior inspires particular social 
trust: the admission creates vulnerability that links even strangers 
together and establishes a basis for social norms on the platform. 
James Grimmelmann showed how social contexts are essential to 
our decisions to share information on online social networks. He ident-
ified several heuristics we use to evaluate the privacy risks associated 
with sharing on Facebook, some of which I will summarize here.43 All 
 
habits); Lorrie Faith Cranor et al., P3P Deployment on Websites, 7 
Electronic Com. Res. & Applications 274, 274 (2008) (explaining the 
importance of privacy policies on websites); Eric C. Turner & Subhasish 
Dasgupta, Privacy on the Web: An Examination of User Concerns, 
Technology, and Implications for Business Organizations and Individuals, 
20 Info. Sys. Mgmt. 8, 16–17 (2003) (explaining the use of privacy-
enhancing technology to improve online trust among internet users). 
37. John, Acquisti & Loewenstein, supra note 5, at 864. 
38. Id. 
39. Han Li, Rathindra Sarathy & Heng Xu, The Role of Affect and Cognition on 
Online Consumers’ Decision to Disclose Personal Information to Unfamiliar 
Online Vendors, 51 Decision Support Sys. 434, 441–43 (2011). 
40. See, e.g., Leon et al., supra note 6, at 7 (noting participants were less will-
ing to disclose information when they believed their information was collect-
ed on any website on the internet). 
41. See Acquisti, John & Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 162 (“[W]hen people are 
surrounded by others who are revealing intimate details about their lives, 
they may conform to the prevailing norm of divulgence.”). 
42. Id. 
43. See Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1160–64 (considering a user’s conscious 
and subconscious reliance on proxies for privacy risks when using social 
media). Grimmelmann also noted that these heuristics do not always 
effectively or accurately assess privacy risks on Facebook. Id. 
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of them are proxies for trust.44 First, bigness. Facebook’s pride in being 
the largest social network on the planet is not rooted in a simple 
obsession with size. Rather, having lots of other people sharing is 
essential to encourage us to share with them. As Grimmelmann notes, 
millions of people can’t be wrong. Our “Facebook-trusting friends” must 
know that the platform is safe; bigness shields us from the risk of being 
singled out for a privacy invasion.45 In both of these ways, size is one 
way to identify a context of trust: more than one billion users actively 
sharing information on Facebook is like Alice safeguarding Brady’s 
spare keys one billion times. Facebook’s size and growth make it more 
predictable as a safe place for sharing. We see massive crowds posting 
information, and rarely, if ever, hear about anything going wrong. And 
Facebook is designed to emphasize its bigness. Step one after signing 
up lets us use our email contacts to see which of our friends are already 
members and which we can invite, thus making the community bigger. 
Whenever another member sends us a “friend request,” or a request to 
be added to our network, Facebook lists her network size and the 
number of mutual friends we have in common. And it includes the 
number of people who have liked or commented on a post above and 
below the content on our News Feeds. And, of course, Facebook brags 
about its size all the time.46 It does so because platforms that are big 
are more trustworthy. 
Second, community. Facebook’s design makes us think that we’re 
talking to specific other people in controlled spaces. We see others’ faces 
and are taken to others’ personal profile pages to interact with them. 
This creates a perception of safety.47 The members of our social 
networks on Facebook also tend to be like us in some ways, so we 
 
44. Although Grimmelmann used the word “trust” several times in Saving 
Facebook, he stops short of grouping these tools as proxies for understanding 
privacy and sharing decisions as based on particular social trust. Id. 
45. Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1161–62. 
46. And size matters when it comes to ad revenue on the web. See, e.g., Jim 
Edwards, In Just 2 Years, Google and Facebook Have Come to Control 
75% of All Mobile Advertising, Business Insider (Mar. 20, 2014, 5:29 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-and-facebook-dominate-mobile 
-advertising-2014-3 [https://perma.cc/36HB-YB8U] (noting that Facebook 
and Google, two of the largest companies in web advertising, “have gone 
from a position of merely being two big, fast-growing players in mobile 
advertising to dominating it completely”). 
47. This type of rich social profile may be an effective design strategy to create 
safe online environments. As Danielle Citron has suggested, profiles that 
humanize internet users may stimulate interaction norms against online 
harassment. See Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace 
239–41 (2014) (“Just as the anonymity of networked interactions can in-
fluence our behavior, so can a site’s environment.”). 
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assume they are like us in a lot of ways.48 The more familiar someone 
else appears to us, as Max Weber and Talcott Parsons noted, the more 
we are likely to bring her into our confidences.49 Facebook also breeds 
a sense of familiarity by making all friends seem fungible: our closest 
friend and that guy we met at yoga are all defaulted as “friends.” This 
makes us think we can share similar information with both of them.50 
That these qualities of Facebook encourage us to share information 
with others, even when it is risky, is in line with much of the social 
science literature on the development of trust. Trust that individuals 
will behave according to norms of confidentiality and discretion could 
arise in a variety of contexts, all of them would seem to make sharing 
more likely. The most obvious sources of particular social trust are when 
the context includes explicit cues, like a confidentiality clause or 
prefacing a conversation with, “This is to be kept between us.” Subtler 
indications of expectations of confidentiality are just as strong: two 
people sharing a secret at a party might physically turn their bodies 
away from the crowd, huddle down, and whisper.51 Grimmelmann refers 
to this as the “I know how much this means to you” heuristic.52 
Furthermore, a friend in need may ask another friend for advice 
regarding a particularly sensitive, intimate, or personal problem. Trust 
and confidentiality also may be implied from certain professional 
 
48. See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 53–54 (2007) (arguing that uni-
formity of social networks creates echo chambers of views). 
49. See Max Weber, The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, in 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 303, 312 (H. H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills eds., 1948) (arguing that common membership in the 
Protestant sect in early America allowed people who did not really know 
each other to trust that they would be competent contractual partners); 
Talcott Parsons, Action Theory and the Human Condition 47 
(1978) (“People defined as sharing one’s values or concrete goals and in 
whose competence and integrity one has ‘confidence’ come to be thought of 
as ‘trustworthy individuals’ or ‘types.’”). 
50. See Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1162 (“We don’t say private things to 
people we don’t know. Facebook is great at making us feel like we know 
lots of people.”). 
51. These implicit cues of confidentiality are discussed at length in Erving 
Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 112–32 (1959) 
(discussing the “backstage” of social interaction). See also Erving 
Goffman, Strategic Interaction (Erving Goffman & Dell Hymes eds., 
1969) (analyzing interpersonal dealings at the intersection of emotional 
expression and human intelligence). 
52. Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1163. 
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contexts53 and from a long history of interaction54: if Brady kept Alice’s 
spare keys and never broke into her home, Alice is likely to continue 
trusting Brady with her home’s security. These explicit and implicit 
indicia of information security allow the disclosing party to trust that 
the recipient of her information will continue to respect prevailing 
norms of confidentiality, thus encouraging sharing in the first place. 
But the way trust works most often is through transference from 
knowns to unknowns—namely, from those we do know to strangers, or 
from people we know to websites we do not. For example, we may trust 
experts and other professionals based on their degrees, transferring the 
trust we have in a school’s reputation, which we know, to one of its 
graduates, whom we do not.55 There is some evidence that we trust 
lawyers and doctors based on firm or hospital affiliations, respectively,56 
and even office location in prime real estate57 and office design.58 The 
transference process does not end there. Many of us do not choose 
doctors based solely on their degrees. Rather, we rely on the  
53. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) (“We hold 
today that a duty of confidentiality arises from the physician-patient 
relationship . . . .”); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 
(Idaho 1961) (holding a bank manager liable for breach of bank’s duty of 
confidence when he divulged details of the plaintiff’s unsteady finances to 
the plaintiff’s employer). 
54. See, e.g., Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life 98–99 
(1964) (“Since social exchange requires trusting others to reciprocate, the 
initial problem is to prove oneself trustworthy . . . . As individuals regularly 
discharge their obligations, they prove themselves trustworthy of further 
credit.”); John K. Rempel et al., Trust in Close Relationships, 49 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 95, 96 (1985); Doney et al., supra note 23, 
at 605 (“[T]he greater the variety of shared experiences, the greater the 
generated knowledge base and the more a target’s behavior becomes 
predictable.”) (citation omitted). 
55. See Doney et al., supra note 23, at 606 (“[T]rust may develop through a 
transference process, during which the trustor transfers trust from a known 
entity to an unknown one.”). 
56. Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is 
It, Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 Milbank Q. 613, 619–20 
(2001). 
57. See Shawn G. Kennedy, About Real Estate: Law Firms Actively Leasing 
Office Space in Midtown, N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 1987), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1987/02/18/business/about-real-estate-law-firms-actively-
leasing-office-space-in-midtown.html [https://perma.cc/8X2Y-P8YD] (des-
cribing the importance of elaborate office spaces in centralized locations for 
law firms to project success and promote confidence in their services). 
58. See David Lat, The Best Law Firm Offices in America: The Finalists!, 
Above the Law (Aug. 30, 2012, 6:19 PM), http://abovethelaw.com 
/2012/08/the-best-law-firm-offices-in-america-the-finalists/2/ [https:// 
perma.cc/82VU-LVNE] (naming the “best law firm offices in America” based 
on architectural aesthetics, elaborate furnishings, and refined décor). 
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recommendations of others and, in particular, those that we respect.59 
This transference of trust from those we know to those we do not 
operates in the lay context as well. Mark Granovetter has shown that 
economic actors transfer trust to an unknown party based on how 
embedded the unknown actor is in a familiar and trusted social 
network.60 And several studies have shown that social actors tend to 
trust strangers if they share the same important, perhaps stigmatizing, 
in-group identity.61 This transference mechanism may be at play when 
the individuals in Acquisti’s study shared stigmatizing information 
more readily after learning that others had already done the same. 
Transference of trust is also at the heart of Grimmelmann’s heuristics: 
we transfer the trust we put in herds, familiar intimates, and 
confidential situations, generally, to specific cases of interaction on 
Facebook. 
C. Trust, Sharing, and Privacy 
Therefore, there may be a correlation between particular social 
trust and an individual’s propensity to disclose personal information on 
online social networks. If there is, our understanding of privacy risks 
must evolve as well. When recognized at all, the relationship between 
privacy and trust is usually functional—namely, trust builds privacy, 
or privacy builds trust. Such a view may make privacy good for 
business, but it does not adequately protect personal privacy in the age 
of Facebook. 
Implicit in laws like the California Online Privacy Protection Act, 
which requires that any website collecting personally identifiable in-
formation from a California resident post a privacy policy,62 and explicit 
in recommendations from the FTC that encourage websites to be 
 
59. See Roni Caryn Rabin, You Can Find Dr. Right, with Some Effort, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/health/ 
30find.html [https://perma.cc/GW8B-MYJH] (noting the difficulty of 
objectively measuring physician qualifications as the basis for people having to 
rely on recommendations from friends and family when choosing a doctor). 
60. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481, 490 (1985) (discussing the 
“role of concrete personal relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of 
[embedded] relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance”). 
61. See Michele Williams, In Whom We Trust: Group Membership as an 
Affective Context for Trust Development, 26 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 377, 381, 
385 (2001) (“People tend to associate positive beliefs and feelings with the 
groups to which they belong.”). 
62. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575–22579 (West 2014). Delaware recently 
passed a similar statute. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1201C–1206C (West 
2016). 
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transparent about their data use practices,63 is the notion that pro-
tecting privacy builds trust. These policies require and encourage web 
platforms to both be honest with users about data uses and aggressively 
protect users’ personally identifiable information. Scholars are taking 
note of these policies. Kirsten Martin argues that, all else being equal, 
a website’s failure to meet the privacy expectations of users will 
negatively impact the trust those users have in the website.64 Neil 
Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, furthermore, have argued that privacy 
should be conceptualized as a builder of trust rather than as a shield 
against invasions. Part rhetorical, part substantive, Richards’s and 
Hartzog’s argument is that privacy laws should be the tools that build 
trust in information sharing relationships.65 
These are important first steps in reminding online platforms that 
privacy is good business. But if sharing occurs in contexts of particular 
social trust, it is not clear that these understandings of privacy are 
sufficient to adapt privacy to the digital age. In a world where petabytes 
of our data are in the hands of third parties66 and at risk of further 
disclosure to private as well as government actors, saying that privacy 
builds trust does not provide a clear doctrinal path for continued 
privacy protection for information known to some others.67 Merely 
 
63. See Fed. Trade Comm’n., supra note 18, at 3 (emphasizing the 
importance of short, effective, and accessible privacy disclosures as a 
means to build trust with online users). 
64. Kirsten Martin, Formal Versus Informal Privacy Contracts: Comparing the 
Impact of Privacy Notices and Norms on Consumer Trust Online 1 (Oct. 5, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.uchicago.edu 
/files/file/martin_formal_versus_informal_privacy_contracts.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KKP7-RSJB]. 
65. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 13, at 34. 
66. A petabyte’s size is difficult to conceive. If I told you that a petabyte is one 
quadrillion bytes, that would still be pretty inscrutable. Put it this way: 
together, all United States academic libraries hold just two petabytes of data. 
Facebook, consequently, has about 150 times more data than every academic 
library in the United States. Julian Bunn, How Big Is a Petabyte, Exabyte, 
Zettabyte, or a Yottabyte?, High Scalability (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:15 AM), 
http://highscalability.com/blog/2012/9/11/how-big-is-a-petabyte 
-exabyte-zettabyte-or-a-yottabyte.html [https://perma.cc/H5TD-4G3J]. 
67. Many scholars have addressed this problem in different ways. See, e.g., Julie 
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 
52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1427–28 (2000) (arguing for a “constitutive” 
relationship between the flow of information and self-development); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 815, 856–57 
(2000) (relying on “bandwagon effects” in which the government serves as a 
model infrastructure for limiting the transmission of falsified information 
online). See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 
Wash. L. Rev. 119 (2004) (arguing that the collection and aggregation of 
personal information disrupts our expectations of what will happen to our 
information); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 
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requiring notice of data use practices under the governing notice-and-
choice approach to privacy ignores the myriad ways in which web 
platforms can manipulate our propensity to share through leveraging, 
among other tools, website design and the information they collect 
about our social networks. And seeing trust as a byproduct of a func-
tioning privacy regime misses the fact that sharers tend to expect pri-
vacy protection where trust exists already. 
Seeing trust as antecedent to privacy judgments is a step in the 
right direction. This is the idea that users will only make privacy-re-
lated decisions based on perceptions of trust, and it is implicit in opt-
in clauses and “just-in-time” notifications. For example, the FTC rec-
ommends that before mobile apps access sensitive information, they 
should provide concurrent disclosures of the impending data use and 
“obtain affirmative express consent” from users.68 Per the FTC, 
“[p]roviding such a disclosure at the point in time when it matters to 
consumers, just prior to the collection of such information by apps, will 
allow users to make informed choices about whether to allow the 
collection of such information.”69 
But these may not be the only ways websites build trust with their 
users. This Article argues that our trust in websites, or our expectations 
that they will use our data according to prevailing social norms of 
discretion, may also come from specific determinations about who 
among our friends also uses the website, clicks on a link, buys a product, 
or shares information. Privacy scholars have been inching closer to this 
trust-building, information-sharing mechanism. Meanwhile, social 
networks like Facebook are far ahead.70 
 
1087 (2002) (contending that different information privacy invasions, 
including the collection of digital dossiers on individuals, implicate a variety 
of overlapping interests rather than one single common denominator). See 
also Waldman, supra note 13 (arguing that information privacy should be 
understood as protecting relationships of trust in order to protect as private 
information known to some others). 
68. Fed. Trade Comm’n., supra note 18, at 15. See also Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, 
Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers 60 (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2HVK-5P2Y] (suggesting that companies “make privacy 
statements clearer, shorter, and more standardized; give consumers 
reasonable access to their data; and undertake consumer education efforts to 
improve consumers’ understanding of how companies collect, use, and share 
their data”). 
69. Fed. Trade Comm’n., supra note 18, at 15. 
70. See Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1151–60 (detailing the ways Facebook 
“drives users to release personal information”). 
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II. Research Design, Methodology, and Data 
I designed an empirical study to test the link between trust and 
sharing, asking: What effect, if any, does particular social trust have on 
internet users’ willingness to share personal information on online social 
networks? This study included survey questions to identify what 
information respondents shared on Facebook, why they share it, and 
for what reasons, if at all, they would share information with strangers.71 
Based on this survey, this Article concludes that among participants in 
online social networks like Facebook, particular social trust contributes 
to individuals’ propensity to share: sharing increases when trust 
increases and trust in Facebook is correlated with having friends on 
Facebook that users trust. Facebook has known this trust-sharing link 
for some time, and has been exploiting it to encourage us to cede even 
more control over our information. The policy and regulatory 
implications of that conclusion are discussed after this Section. 
A. Facebook 
Facebook was chosen as the platform for this research because of 
its size and its massive data collection practices. It is the largest and 
most popular online social network. As of March, 2016, it had more 
than 1.65 billion monthly active users, 1.09 billion daily active users, 
989 million mobile daily active users, and 1.51 billion mobile monthly 
active users.72 Given its size, it is a voracious gatherer of information,  
71. Respondents were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online 
marketplace that pays individuals to crowd source the completion of various 
tasks, including research surveys. Responses were collected at several points 
during 2015. Workers were not permitted to complete the survey more than 
once. Several studies have shown that Amazon Turk offers researchers a 
random sample of respondents with a demographic distribution roughly 
comparable to the United States population. See, e.g., Tara S. Behrend et 
al., The Viability of Crowdsourcing for Survey Research, 43 Behav. Res. 
Methods 800, 800–13 (2011) (concluding that crowdsourcing platforms, such 
as Amazon Mechanical Turk, are “efficient and appropriate alternative[s] to 
a university participant pool”); Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 Judgment & Decision Making 416 (2010) 
(confirming that Mechanical Turk is a “reliable source of experimental data 
in judgment and decision-making”). Turkers were paid for their time: on 
average, the survey took nineteen minutes and twenty-eight seconds to 
complete, resulting in a $4.62 hourly rate. To be eligible to participate, 
Turkers were required to have at least a 95% approval rating for 1000 
completed tasks on the platforms. This relatively high pay and high approval 
rating and experience, plus screening checks that determined, as best as 
possible, whether workers had made a good faith effort to complete the 
survey, were meant to ensure honest and accurate responses. 
72. Newsroom, Facebook (June 26, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20160626012315/http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc 
/2S8D-KV6A]. For the current statistics, see Facebook Newsroom, 
http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited June 26, 2016). 
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some which we hand over directly and some of which is gathered 
without our knowledge. It is worth summarizing both processes. 
To sign up for an account we have to provide our names, email 
addresses or mobile numbers,73 dates of birth, and genders. After that, 
we are asked to allow Facebook to mine our email contacts so we can 
see which of our friends are already members and which we can invite 
to join.74 These contacts will constitute the core of our network, aptly 
called “friends.” Then we can get started filling out our profiles by up-
loading a picture and a “cover” photo that sits at the top of our profile 
page. If we can’t think of anything to post, Facebook is there with a 
helpful nudge: “Select a photo to appear at the top of your profile. It 
could be from a recent trip or something you’re proud of.” Facebook is 
designed to make image management easy.75 
Adding a profile photo, Facebook reminds us, is the best way for 
other people to know who we are. Facebook’s design lets us easily drop 
in employment, education, and professional information, as well as 
location data (past and present), contact information, a personal 
website URL, what gender of person we’re interested in meeting, the 
languages we speak, our political and religious views, our relationship 
status, family members, and even how to pronounce our names. Life 
events—birth, graduation, marriage, braces removed, or that 
memorable trip to Florence—come next. We can add sports teams that 
we support, music that we enjoy, movies and television shows that we 
watch, books that we have read, and athletes, celebrities, and even 
restaurants that we like.76 
Once our profile is ready and we are active on the platform, data 
sharing only increases. We can upload photos of ourselves and others 
and “tag” them, or identify them with a link to their profile.77 
Sometimes, users have to consent before someone else can tag them, 
but even if they decline, their unlinked name still appears on the photo 
or in its caption. We can send direct “Messages” to others or “Poke” 
 
73. If you do not provide your mobile number upon registration, Facebook will 
frequently remind you to provide it to “make your account more secure.” 
See Help Center: Why Am I Being Asked to Add My Phone Number to My 
Account?, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/1137953062904148 
[https://perma.cc/HT55-AJW5] (last visited June 22, 2016). 
74. Step 1: Find Your Friends, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ 
gettingstarted/?step=contact_importer (last visited October 21, 2016). 
75. See Goffman, supra note 51, at 25 (using an extended metaphor of the 
back-stage and front-stage of a play to argue that we present ourselves to 
others in ways that may be different from the reality of who we are). 
76. This summary—and it is only a summary—is based on the author going 
through the steps necessary to create a Facebook account from scratch. 
77. How Tagging Works, Facebook https://www.facebook.com/about/ 
tagging [https://perma.cc/C47H-3EJN] (last visited June 22, 2016). 
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someone to flirt.78 We can play any of the multitude of apps and games 
on the Facebook platform, including FarmVille.79 We can post 
comments to a friend’s “timeline” or tag them in posts on our own.80 
We can also tag a location for those posts, so the Facebook universe 
knows where we are.81 And unless a we restrict certain posts from 
appearing in our timelines, most of those posts will appear in a “News 
Feed,” or the running list of stories, interactions, and contributions that 
we see when we log in.82 We can then comment on these posts, share 
them with our own network, share them on another network, like 
Twitter, and “react” to the post with one of six reactions: Love, Laugh, 
Wow, Sad, Angry, and, of course, Like.83 
The Facebook “like” button, a right-handed, white thumbs up on 
the Facebook blue background,84 may be the greatest source of 
information that Facebook collects. According to some sources, there 
have been a total of 1.13 trillion “likes” since Facebook started in 2004. 
Today, there are approximately 4.5 billion “likes” per day and 3.1 
 
78. See Jackie Cohen, 5 Rules of Facebook Flirting, Social Times (Apr. 14, 
2009, 11:11 AM), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/facebook-flirting/ 
308415 [https://perma.cc/4HER-M8N6] (“A girlfriend recently asked me to 
explain the concept of ‘poking’ on Facebook. I told her that it meant that 
someone is flirting with her, of course. I mean, isn’t it obvious? Back in 
second grade, the boys would chase us around the room, grab, hit and poke 
us until we giggled so hard we had ‘accidents.’ Or was that just me?”). 
79. FarmVille Page, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/FarmVille/ 
[https://perma.cc/QV6Y-8CM3] (last visited June 22, 2016). But see Saqib 
Khan, How to Block Annoying Game Requests from Your Facebook Friends, 
ValueWalk (Mar. 4, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/ 
2014/03/block-game-requests-on-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/5VL7-LHFU]. 
80. How Do I Post to My Timeline, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ 
help/1462219934017791 [https://perma.cc/ST7W-BBQ8] (last visited June 
22, 2016). 
81. According to some sources, there are seventeen billion location-tagged posts 
per day on Facebook. Kevin Ho, 41 Up-to-Date Facebook Facts and Stats, 
Wishpond (2015), http://blog.wishpond.com/post/115675435109/ 
40-up-to-date-facebook-facts-and-stats [https://perma.cc/8U97-DXMT]. 
82. How News Feed Works, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
327131014036297/ [https://perma.cc/GFR9-AX3B] (last visited June 22, 
2016). 
83. Sammi Krug, Reactions Now Available Globally, Facebook (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/02/reactions-now-available-globally/ 
[https://perma.cc/9N7X-EEA3]. 
84. See Leo Widrich, Why Is Facebook Blue? The Science Behind Colors in 
Marketing, Fast Company (May 6, 2013, 6:02 AM), http://www. 
fastcompany.com/3009317/why-is-facebook-blue-the-science-behind-colors-
in-marketing [https://perma.cc/6K3J-K455] (explaining the use of various 
colors in marketing and the effects they have on viewers). 
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million per minute.85 As we “like” our friends’ posts, pictures, and 
comments, we are doing two things: first, we are engaging in image and 
reputation management by showing our Facebook networks what 
interests and engages us;86 second, we are rounding out an already 
reasonably rich picture of ourselves for Facebook. If we “like” several 
posts about the Democratic candidate for President alongside posts 
about the need to reduce our carbon footprint, increase infrastructure 
spending, and fight against discrimination, Facebook has a pretty good 
idea about the kinds of candidates and causes we will support. It could, 
then, use that data to influence us.87 
The “like” button also crosses the divide between information that 
we voluntarily hand over to Facebook and data that the platform 
collects from tracking us online. To understand how Facebook’s “like” 
button helps it gather information about us, we need a brief primer on 
data tracking.88 
Websites need to remember us as we travel around the web. To do 
this, they leave cookies, or tiny files, on our computers that allow 
websites to identify who is visiting their platform and what they did 
there. Cookies, then, are the internet’s memory capsules. Thanks to 
Amazon’s cookie, for example, I can put a plush Judy Hopps (from the 
Disney movie, Zootopia)89 in my Cart, close the window, and have the 
 
85. Ho, supra note 81. 
86. See Veikko Eranti & Markku Lonkila, The Social Significance of the 
Facebook Like Button, First Monday (June 1, 2015), http:// 
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5505/4581#3a [https:// 
perma.cc/2LQM-M6DB] (detailing how Facebook tracks a user’s interests 
and hobbies via that user’s use of the “Like” button). 
87. See Robinson Meyer, How Facebook Could Tilt the 2016 Election, The 
Atlantic (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/ 
archive/2016/04/how-facebook-could-tilt-the-2016-election-donald-trump/ 
478764/ [https://perma.cc/DB4C-KGNM] (analyzing the effects Facebook 
could have on voter turnout). 
88. Much of the following discussion is based on Franziska Roesner, Tadayoshi 
Kohno & David Wetherall, Detecting and Defending Against Third-Party 
Tracking on the Web, 9th USENIX Symp. on Networked Systems 
Design and Implementation (2012), https://www.usenix.org/system 
/files/conference/nsdi12/nsdi12-final17.pdf, and on email conversations with 
Jonathan Frankle, Staff Technologist at the Center for Privacy and 
Technology at Georgetown University Law Center. Notably, none of this is 
explained in Facebook’s Data Policy. See Data Policy, Facebook, 
https://www.facebook.com/policy.php [https://perma.cc/DPP5-CPRS] 
(last visited June 23, 2016) (explaining how Facebook does and does not use 
the data it collects). 
89. It’s adorable. See Zootopia Large Plush Office Judy Hopps, Amazon.com, 
https://www.amazon.com/Zootopia-Large-Plush-Office-Hopps/dp/ 
B016LBYL42/ref=sr_1_4?s=toys-and-games&ie=UTF8&qid= 
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item back in my Cart when I visit Amazon days later. The cookie 
Amazon put on my computer, tagged uniquely to identify me, helps 
create this seamless, convenient, and tailored internet experience.90 
It is also central to information flows and tracking. Consider the 
New York Times website, www.nytimes.com. Nytimes.com runs several 
ads on its homepage. When I last visited the site, some of the ads I saw 
were from Penguin Random House, the Hillary Clinton Victory Fund, 
Indochino, 11 Beach (“luxury condominiums detailed for Tribeca”), the 
New York Times itself, EMC (a computer storage company), and 
Southwest Airlines.91 These ads sit within “iframes,” or pages within 
the main nytimes.com page.92 It has to be this way; otherwise, 
nytimes.com would have to grant these companies access to its code to 
insert their ad language. As a page within a page, these ads also drop 
cookies onto our computers, allowing them to track us wherever we go. 
If you have ever wanted to know why similar advertisements from the 
same company tend to follow us around the web, that is why. 
“Like” buttons operate in a similar way. Many websites have an 
embedded “Like” button that begs us to “Like Us on Facebook” with a 
simple click.93 When we visit these pages, Facebook may be receiving a 
significant amount of information, including the amount of time we 
spend on the page, what we clicked on, and the browser and operating 
system we use, to name just a few. What’s more, since 2012, Facebook 
has been collecting data about our internet behavior even from websites 
that do not have a “Like” button.94 And Facebook channels that 
information into user-targeted advertisements.95 When we “like” a post 
 
1466705009&sr=1-4&keywords=judy+hopps+plush [https://perma.cc/ 
PJ9P-5LV4]. 
90. See Roesner, Kohno & Wetherall, supra note 88, at 2 (describing cookies and 
their storage and tracking usages). 
91. See N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/ (last visited June 21, 2016). 
92. See Roesner, Kohno & Wetherall, supra note 88, at 2 (explaining how 
websites can embed content from different domains). See also E-mail from 
Jonathan Frankle, Staff Technologist, Center for Privacy and Technology, 
Georgetown University Law Center, to Author (June 23, 2016, 8:27 AM) 
(on file with author). 
93. Any developer can visit Facebook to get the code for the “Like” button and 
drop it into their page. Like Button for the Web, Facebook for 
Developers, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/plugins/like-button 
[https://perma.cc/NV9X-YZTF]. 
94. See Tom Simonite, What Facebook Knows, MIT Tech. Rev. (June 13, 
2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/428150/what-facebook-knows/ 
[https://perma.cc/CFF2-7DVN] (detailing the enormous amount of 
information that Facebook collects from its users, even when users do not use 
the “Like” button). 
95. Tom Simonite, Facebook’s Like Buttons Will Soon Track Your Web 
Browsing to Target Ads, MIT Tech. Rev. (Sept. 16, 2015), 
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by JCrew or ask our networks for advice on where to get a reasonably 
priced, yet modern suit for work, JCrew advertisements start popping 
up on Facebook and everywhere else we go online. It makes sense, then, 
that Facebook has collected more than 300 petabytes of data on us.96 
It is truly a data behemoth. 
In 2012, Facebook revealed that it sweeps in 2.5 billion pieces of 
content and more than 500 terabytes of data each day. With “2.7 billion 
Like actions and 300 million photos per day,” Facebook analyzes nearly 
“105 terabytes of data each half hour,”97 including the personal data we 
provide to the real-time location of our smartphones. The company, 
along with third-party and partner websites, tracks users’ web-browsing 
history, purchases, and other web content.98 It has teamed up with 
corporate data brokers Datalogix, Epsilon, Acxiom, and BlueKai to 
allow companies to display targeted ads on Facebook based on the data 
those brokers have on individual users.99 All of this information is 
essential to the success of Facebook’s business model, relying as it does 
on behavioral advertising, targeting content, and tailoring users’ online 
experiences. Knowing what might make users more or less willing to 
share personal information with Facebook, therefore, matters to both 
privacy advocates and information gatherers. 
B. The Survey 
Part I of the survey asked for basic demographic data: respondents 
selected age categories, gender, education level, sexual orientation, and 
race or ethnicity. Respondents were then asked how much time they 
spend online each day and to select from a list all the social networking 
websites on which they maintain active profiles, where “active” referred 
to any website that respondents viewed or updated regularly. These 
 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541351/facebooks-like-buttons-
will-soon-track-your-web-browsing-to-target-ads/ 
[https://perma.cc/KB76-XSA2]. 
96. Ho, supra note 81. 
97. Josh Constine, How Big Is Facebook’s Data? 2.5 Billion Pieces Of Content 
And 500+ Terabytes Ingested Every Day, TechCrunch (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/22/how-big-is-facebooks-data-2-5-billion-
pieces-of-content-and-500-terabytes-ingested-every-day/ 
[https://perma.cc/UGA4-GGFQ]. 
98. Data Policy, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ 
update/ [https://perma.cc/V8HP-EKW9]. See also Will Oremus, There Are 
Two Kinds of Online Privacy. Facebook Only Likes to Talk About One., 
Slate (Nov. 13, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
future_tense/2014/11/13/facebook_privacy_basics_page_what_it_won_
t_tell_you_about_personal_data.html [https://perma.cc/X576-K4X3] 
(detailing all the ways Facebook tracks its users). 
99. New Ways to Reach the Right Audience, Facebook (Feb. 27, 2013), 
https://www.facebook-studio.com/news/item/new-ways-to-reach-the right 
-audience [https://perma.cc/D2L6-B5S6]. 
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two questions are commonly used by social science researchers to assess 
how “networked” an individual is; a high number of active profiles or 
many hours spent online may be correlated with increased sharing of 
personal information. 
Part II of the survey concerned what type of information users share 
on Facebook. Twenty-seven different items were selected based on 
Pew’s research, my own observations of sharing on Facebook, and 
advice from research assistants. Respondents were asked Yes/No ques-
tions about whether they shared the given information. The questions 
ranged from, “Do you share jokes or funny videos?” to “Do you share 
your personal email address?” When coding the responses for analysis, 
I created a “Total Sharing” column that aggregated all “Yes” answers 
and a separate “Total Intimate Sharing” column that aggregated all 
“Yes” answers for items shared that could be consider more personal. 
The questions for which answers constituted the “Total Intimate 
Sharing” data set were selected based on personal value judgments. The 
relative position on the scale itself was not considered relevant; for the 
purposes of this research, it did not matter whether “personal telephone 
number” was more or less intimate than “information about illnesses or 
medication.” Both qualified as “intimate.”100 
Part III of the survey included the standard trust question: 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with strangers? This question 
was asked to obtain baseline information on respondents’ general feel-
ings about trust and trust in others. This section also asked respondents 
how many “friends” they had on Facebook, how many of their close 
friends used the platform, and how much they trusted Facebook to 
protect their privacy. Respondents rated their trust in Facebook on a 
scale of 1 (no trust) to 10 (absolute trust). 
Part IV of the survey asked respondents a series of Likert scale 
questions about their motivations to share information on Facebook. 
The diverse list captured potential emotional, rational, and social 
motivations. For example, respondents were asked if they felt compelled 
to share on Facebook because “everyone [they] know does.” Other 
questions asked if they only “share with certain people on Facebook 
 
100. The information included in the Total Intimate Sharing data set were as 
follows: personal email address, location data, personal phone number, 
information about the respondent’s romantic life, intimate or suggestive 
pictures, sexual orientation, first and last name of the respondent’s partner, 
information about any children, admissions about doing something illegal or 
stigmatized, pictures of the respondent kissing someone else, pictures 
showing the respondent drunk or drinking to excess, names of family 
members, home address, admission of depression or sadness, birth date and 
year, and medical information. This information is more intimate or personal 
than, for example, funny videos, news items, college attended, professional 
accomplishments, non-intimate selfies, hobbies and interests, place of 
employment, and political views on current affairs or issues. 
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[where the information] will stay with those people and not reach a 
wider audience” or if they share because they “have set up privacy 
preferences that protect [their] information from outsiders.” Other 
options sought to determine if people share based on their perception 
of how well Facebook protects their privacy or based on the fact that 
“nothing bad has ever happened” to anyone they knew that shared 
information. The goal of this section was to elicit different possible 
motivations for sharing personal information. This data can be 
compared with the revelation data of the previous section. 
Section V of the survey also included Likert scale questions. These 
questions sought to determine whether certain contextual factors would 
make respondents more or less likely to accept a “friend request” from 
a stranger. This was used as an admittedly imperfect proxy for a 
willingness to share information with strangers to avoid a response bias. 
C. Data Report 
This Section reports on the data collected, including the 
background demographics of the sample and the survey responses. 
1. Background Demographics 
Although the entire survey was anonymous, respondents were re-
quired to identify their age bracket, gender, education level, sexual 
orientation, race or ethnicity, the number of active online social net-
working profiles, and the amount of time they spend online per day. 
There were 629 valid responses (n = 629), of which 46% (287) were 
female and 54% (342) were male. This differs from the wider Facebook 
community, which remains majority female.101 The gender gap has been 
shrinking for some time, however, and women and men now use social 
media platforms at comparable rates.102 It is, therefore, unsurprising 
that some samples of Facebook users would deviate slightly from the 
average gender distribution. 
Users ages 18–24 constituted 14.4% of the sample; 25–34 year-olds 
made up just over 51%. The first group is slightly underrepresented, 
while the second group is overrepresented, when compared with the 
most recent available data.103 Because of this significant deviation from 
 
101. Monica Anderson, Men Catch Up with Women on Overall Social Media 
Use, Pew Res. Ctr. (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/08/28/men-catch-up-with-women-on-overall-social-media-use/ 
[https://perma.cc/3XNV-YZ4S]. 
102. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, Pew Res. Ctr. 3 (Oct. 
8, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/10/PI_2015-10-08_ 
Social-Networking-Usage-2005-2015_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/B68Q-
NG5D]. 
103. Keith N. Hampton et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, Pew Res. 
Ctr. 9 (June 16, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP%20-%20Social%20networking%20sites% 
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the distribution of Facebook users by age, any correlations involving 
age should be questioned and retested with another sample. 
The sample is highly educated, with 85% of respondents reporting 
that they completed at least some college. Several surveys also suggest 
that the Facebook population is highly educated,104 which suggests that 
the sample may resemble the Facebook population, generally, but 
differs from the overall population of Internet users or consumers. The 
sample is also relatively networked. Approximately 71% of respondents 
maintain active profiles on 1, 2, or 3 social networking sites. All 
respondents, by definition, have a Facebook profile; the next most 
popular platforms were LinkedIn and Twitter. 
2. Quantitative Data Analysis 
This Section presents the quantitative analysis of the data co-
llected.105 The Article’s hypotheses are that (1) higher levels of trust 
that Facebook will protect our privacy and higher levels of trust in 
those individuals in our networks are both associated with a higher 
propensity to share personal information, and (2) having a network 
with high levels of trust is associated with trusting that Facebook will 
protect our privacy. The data collected lend credibility to both 
hypotheses. 
Social scientists have not used online social network participants to 
test the relationship between trust and the propensity to share. Al-
though several pieces of data included in the survey could correlate with 
a willingness to share information on Facebook—age, gender, education, 
sexual orientation, race or ethnicity, networked level, time spent online, 
general social trust, trust that Facebook will protect user privacy, how 
many friends one has on Facebook, and how many close friends use 
Facebook—only those factors speaking to trust were found to have any 
statistically significant association.106 With respect to sharing, generally,  
20and%20our%20lives.pdf [https://perma.cc/64HG-NTM4]; Number of 
Facebook Users in the United States as of February 2016, by Age Group (in 
Millions), Statista (Feb. 2016), http://www.statista.com/statistics 
/398136/us-facebook-user-age-groups/ [https://perma.cc/C9R7-SK7A]. 
104. See Hampton et al., supra note 103, at 12. 
105. The raw data is available at New York Law School’s Innovation Center for 
Law and Technology’s Data Privacy Project. 
106. I used bivariate correlation to test relationships and then partial correlation 
to determine if the relationship stood while controlling for other variables. 
Correlation generally refers to the degree and direction of association of 
variable phenomena: how well one can be predicted from the other. Bivariate 
correlations analyze the relationship between two variables and mainly serve 
to test hypotheses for further research. Partial correlations analyze the 
relationship between two or more variables while controlling, or removing, 
one or more variables from the relationship. For example, a data set may 
include: information, gender, highest degree level obtained, and annual 
income. A partial correlation could test the relationship between degree 
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and sharing personal information, a greater propensity to share on 
Facebook is positively associated with the number of Facebook friends 
one has,107 the number of close friends that use Facebook,108 and the 
extent to which one trusts Facebook to protect user privacy.109 This 
means that having more friends, more close friends who use Facebook, 
and greater institutional trust in Facebook are all associated with 
greater sharing of personal information. When controlling for the other 
variables, these associations remained significant. 
Regression analysis confirms a relationship.110 Regression is a form 
of predictive analysis that tries to explain the relationship, if any exists, 
between one dependent variable and one or more independent variables. 
We use regression techniques to answer questions like: Are people who 
are left-hand dominant (independent variable) more or less likely than 
the general population to have high SAT scores (dependent variable)? 
Are redheads more or less likely to be architects? Are those who identify 
as religious more or less likely to vote Republican? We want to know if 
any of a series of independent variables—age, gender, education level, 
and proxies for trust, for example—have an impact on a single 
dependent variable—the willingness to share more information, and 
more personal information, on Facebook.111 
 
obtained and income, controlling for gender, or the relationship between 
annual income and gender, controlling for degree. 
107. For total sharing, r = .197, Sig. = .000. For total intimate sharing, r = .200, 
Sig. = .000. Spearman’s rho correlation—a correlation for variables that are 
at least ordinal—was used because almost all variables in the data set were 
ordinal, i.e., ranked categories: age was reported in categories, as was 
education level, number of Facebook friends, and number of close friends on 
Facebook. All r coefficients were significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), 
indicating statistical significance. 
108. For total sharing, r = .235, Sig. = .000. For total intimate sharing, r = .201, 
Sig. = .000. 
109. For total sharing, r = .311, Sig. = .000. For total intimate sharing, r = .301, 
Sig. = .000. 
110. Regression is a statistical tool used when we want to predict the value of a 
variable based on the value of two or more other variables. Correlations 
merely tell us if there is a relationship. Regression is a much more powerful 
way of explaining what that relationship is. 
111. Using all the independent variables in the survey, the model would have 
violated the multicollinearity assumption of multiple regression. 
Multicollinearity happens when two or more independent variables are highly 
correlated with each other, which makes it difficult to decipher which variable 
is actually causing the dependent variable to differ from the mean. As an 
example, when one football player sacks the quarterback, we have a good idea 
who did what. But when three football players tackle him at the same time, 
it is hard to identify which man made the biggest contribution to the sack. 
In the model, age and education are highly correlated with each other: older 
people tend to be more educated. To fix this problem, I eliminated age and 
education level from the regression analysis. 
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Table 1: Regression Results for Sharing, Generally 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As evident from Table 1, proxies for trust—trust that Facebook 
will protect our privacy, the number of “Facebook friends” we have, 
and the number of close friends we have on the platform—are the only 
statistically significant predictors of a willingness to share, generally. 
More specifically, for every two notches up on the trust scale (“Trust 
in Facebook,” where “1” refers to “no trust” and 10 refers to “complete 
trust”) users are likely to share an additional piece of personal 
information. Similarly, respondents with more than 1000 “Facebook 
friends” shared, on average 1 more piece of information on the platform 
than those with 501-1000 friends. And those with “many” close friends 
on the website share, on average, two more pieces of information than 
those with “some” close friends on the platform. Although these factors 
may only account for just under 20% of sharing behavior (r2=.184), 
factors related to trust must be included in the conversation about our 
propensity to disclose information. What’s more, Table 2 shows that 
the effect of trust is also strong when we focus on sharing particularly 
intimate or personal information. 
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Table 2: Regression Results for Sharing Personal Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other data that can also speak to the relationship between partic-
ular social trust and the decision to share are motivations for accepting 
Facebook “friend requests” from strangers. As discussed above, over-
lapping networks and sharing an important or in-group social identity 
have been found to be strong indicators of trustworthiness in stran-
gers.112 The survey asked respondents several questions about whether 
a given piece of information about a stranger, defined as an individual 
they had never met offline in person before, would make it more or less 
likely that they would accept the stranger’s “friend request.” They 
covered a wide range of possible reasons for accepting a “friend request” 
from a stranger, from “large number of mutual friends” and “the 
stranger is friends with your close friends” to “physical attractiveness” 
and “you will never see the stranger in real life.” Answers to the first 
and second questions would speak to the strength of overlapping 
networks and the presence of particular social trust in that network. 
Respondents were also asked if they are more likely to accept a “friend 
request” from a stranger who shares their minority status. This last 
question was used as a proxy for determining the role of an important 
in-group identity in developing a connection with a stranger. These 
factors could then be tested for any relationship with expecting 
Facebook to protect user privacy, thus suggesting that particular social 
trust plays a role in the development of institutional trust. 
Many of the factors that received an overwhelming concentration 
of “more likely” and “much more likely” answers are proxies for partic-
ular social trust. For example, 85% of users would accept a “friend 
request” from a stranger if they shared a large number of mutual 
friends. More than 81% of respondents would accept a request if the 
stranger was friends with their close friends. And although only 18.3% 
would be more likely to accept a “friend request” from a stranger that  
112. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
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shared their same sexual orientation, approximately half of those res-
pondents also identified as members of the LGBT community. These 
are cues of trustworthiness based on strong overlapping networks and 
in-group identity: as discussed above, individuals routinely transfer the 
trust they have in known entities (friends and close friends) to unknown 
entities (strangers).113 The next most important factor was evidence of 
active participation on Facebook (63.3%), which is another social cue 
of trustworthiness: active participation suggests that the account is real, 
mitigating the risks associated with bringing a stranger inside a 
network. This is, of course, precisely the role of particular social trust.114 
Given the amount of information someone can learn about us if 
they are among our Facebook “friends,” accepting “friend requests” 
from strangers based on transferring trust indicates the power of par-
ticular social trust in the propensity to share information. Attractive-
ness or sharing similar names, genders, hometowns, locations, or 
hobbies and interests were not considered important or, in only a few 
cases, made respondents less likely to accept the “friend request.” These 
factors are unrelated to particular social trust: none of them are strong 
indicators of predictable behavior according to accepted social norms. 
Notably, 27% of respondents stated that they were less likely to add a 
stranger to their network if they knew they would never meet the 
stranger in person, suggesting that, at least on Facebook, anonymity is 
not an invitation to share. 
The Article’s second hypothesis is that having trusted friends on 
Facebook is associated with trusting that Facebook will protect our 
privacy. This can sound strange: trust in others has little to do with 
how well Facebook protects user privacy. If this relationship exists, 
however, social networks can gain our trust not only by actually pro-
tecting privacy. They can also manipulate us into sharing more infor-
mation with them by exploiting our relationships with our friends. The 
data suggests that general social trust is strongly predictive of institu-
tional trust in Facebook, but particular social trust is weakly predictive. 
Responding that we do generally trust other people is associated with 
a more than one step increase on the 1–10 Facebook trust scale 
compared to those who respond that generally do not trust others.115 
This is in line with current research, as well.116 With respect to 
particular social trust, survey data on network size and the presence of  
113. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text. 
115. Using a multiple regression model: Coefficient = 1.263, Sig. = .000. 
116. See D. Harrison McKnight, Vivek Choudhury & Charles Kacmar, 
Developing and Validating Trust Measures for e-Commerce: An Integrative 
Typology, 13 Info. Sys. Res. 334, 337–40 (2002) (finding that in terms of 
institutional trust, users who have had successful internet experiences in the 
past will continue to trust that institution in the future). 
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close friends on Facebook could serve as proxies. These factors are 
weaker predictors of trust in Facebook, but the relationship is still 
statistically significant: having a larger network was associated with a 
0.62 increase in trust that Facebook would protect one’s privacy; having 
more close friends on the platform predicted an even smaller increase.117 
Admittedly, the indicators of particular social trust are weak predictors 
of trust that Facebook will protect user privacy. But even a weak, yet 
statistically significant, relationship is notable. 
III. Significance of Findings 
This Article presents data suggesting that (a) an individual’s ex-
pectation that an online social network will protect his or her privacy 
is predictive of the propensity to share personal information on that 
website, (b) having a large network of many close friends on the website 
is another predictor of a willingness to share, and (c) although being a 
trusting person is a stronger predictor of expecting an online social 
network to protect user privacy than having many close friends on the 
network, the presence of many close friends on Facebook was also 
predictive of trust in the platform. This data lends further support for 
the argument that self-disclosure is contextual, and, in particular, that 
the propensity to share is based on trust. The implications of this 
research fall into two categories. Online social networks like Facebook 
already know about the connection between particular social trust and 
sharing; it explains various facets of Facebook’s design. But some 
elements of that design may manipulate us into sharing more than we 
intend. Privacy lawyers, scholars, and regulators should also recognize 
that information tends to be shared in contexts characterized by 
particular social trust. Regulators should ensure that web platforms are 
not manipulating trust to deceitfully encourage users to share personal 
information. 
A. How Facebook Exploits Trust 
For online platforms, establishing trust with users is critical if they 
want us to share our personal information. This study suggests that the 
relationship holds for social networking sites, as well. The data also 
suggest that indicators of particular social trust, including having many 
close friends on Facebook, are also important in predicting a users’ 
willingness to share. Therefore, platforms may be able to encourage 
sharing by letting users know that their friends have also shared.118 
 
117. Network size: Coefficient = .627, Sig. = .000. Number of close friends on 
Facebook: Coefficient = .204; Sig. = .002. 
118. This is also in line with the current literature on e-commerce websites. See 
Acquisti, John & Loewenstein, supra note 3, at 160. 
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Facebook already designs its platform to encourage users to share 
with each other, or as James Grimmelmann has argued, to “scratch its 
users’ social itches.”119 It lets us craft and maintain public profiles, 
which allow us to articulate a particular message about who we are.120 
It also lets us join affinity groups and causes and publicizes what we 
post on others’ Timelines.121 Facebook deepens our connections to 
friends and helps establish new ones: we add people as contacts or 
“friends,” send notes or messages or pictures of birthday cakes with our 
friends’ names on them, and “tag” people in our own content.122 And it 
does all of this publicly to encourage reciprocal sharing.123 Facebook also 
helps us find community and establishes our value in that community. 
We add connections, make comments, and share our passions because 
doing so helps us find other, similarly situated potential friends and 
mates. And adding connections increases our social capital.124 
Facebook leverages trust, thereby encouraging us to share, by tell-
ing us what our friends are up to. When we join, it tells us who else has 
joined and lets us invite friendly faces along with us. When we seek to 
join affinity groups or causes, those pages immediately tell us who 
among our friends are also members of the community. When we log 
on, our friends’ likes, viewpoints, and interests are on the home page, 
visible to us by a default organizational algorithm that privileges the 
social interactions of those closest to us. When we receive “Friend 
Requests” from another Facebook user, the number of friends we have 
in common appears immediately below the user’s name. Hovering over 
the number tells us our mutual friends, or who sits in both networks. 
This information gives us clues as to the requester’s trustworthiness, 
allowing us to transfer the trust we have in our friends to an unknown, 
which is particularly important for someone we have never met 
offline.125  
119. Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1151. 
120. Id. at 1152–53. 
121. Id. at 1153. 
122. How Tagging Works, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/about/ 
tagging [https://perma.cc/Z92V-G6DQ] (last visited June 21, 2016). 
123. See Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 1156 (“Facebook’s design encourages 
reciprocal behavior by making the gesture-and-return cycle visible and 
salient.”). 
124. Id. at 1157–58. 
125. Research from the Pew Research Center suggests that 31% of young people 
have reported accepting “Friend Requests” from strangers, i.e., persons they 
have never met offline. Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Friendship, 
Strangers, and Safety in Online Social Networks, Pew Res. Ctr. (Apr. 18, 
2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/2007/04/18/friendship- 
strangers-and-safety-in-online-social-networks/ [https://perma.cc/RVR8-
28HT]. 
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In a series of updates from April, 2015, through July, 2016, Face-
book stepped up its strategy of leveraging trust to encourage us to 
share. More specifically, the News Feed algorithm was tweaked to give 
greater preference to posts and interactions from friends and family, 
pushing them to the top of Feed.126 Facebook sold this change as a way 
to realize the platform’s founding “idea of connecting people with their 
friends and family” and to keep us “connected to the people, places and 
things [we] want to be connected to.”127 That may be true, but no 
Facebook design change can be understood independent of the plat-
form’s insatiable appetite for user data. Privileging the posts of friends 
and family over the posts of third party publishers themselves may limit 
the reach of a naked post from Vocativ or Upworthy, but not when one 
of their videos is shared by a friend.128 That is ideal for Facebook for 
two reasons. First, users tend to dislike seeing posts from third parties; 
second, under the new design, most third party content that users see 
will come through their trusted social networks of friends. This cues the 
trustworthiness of the post far better than any naked post from a 
publisher ever could. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126. Lars Backstrom, News Feed FYI: Helping Make Sure You Don’t Miss Stories 
from Friends, Facebook (June 29, 2016), http://newsroom.fb.com 
/news/2016/06/news-feed-fyi-helping-make-sure-you-dont-miss-stories-from 
-friends/ [https://perma.cc/2GZ4-T35C]. Max Eulenstein & Lauren Scissors, 
News Feed FYI: Balancing Content from Friends and Pages, Facebook 
(Apr. 21, 2015), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/04/news-feed-fyi-
balancing-content-from-friends-and-pages/ [https://perma.cc/5VMK 
-Z8UL] (describing how Facebook’s updates prioritize content posted by 
friends that the user cares about the most). 
127. Backstrom, supra note 126. 
128. See Mike Isaac & Sydney Ember, Facebook to Change News Feed to Focus 
on Friends and Family, N.Y. Times (June 29, 2016), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/technology/facebook-to-change-news-feed-to-
focus-on-friends-and-family.html [https://perma.cc/PHG2-HLLM] (“[C]on-
tent posted by publishers will show up less prominently in news feeds, 
resulting in significantly less traffic to the hundreds of news media sites that 
have come to rely on Facebook.”). 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 1, member posts from inside and outside our 
networks notify us if a friend has recently added a comment—“Lisa 
Simpson replied to a comment on this post”—or is simply mentioned 
in the post—“Charlie Brown and Peppermint Patty were mentioned in 
a post.” Furthermore, rather than just listing the number of “likes” for 
a given post, Facebook tells us that “Abbi Jacobson, Ilana Glazer and 
76 others like this.” When none of our friends have liked a post, the 
note reads, “9 people like this.” After an update to its design in July, 
2016, Instagram does this, too. This design strategy, when applied to 
social posts, helps grease the wheels of social interaction by indicating 
that the post is real, engaging, and trustworthy. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When applied to native advertisements in the News Feed, this 
tactic confuses and obscures, manipulating us into clicking on a third 
party’s post. Native advertisements, or third-party links that are de-
signed to look like social posts, also appear on our News Feeds. Like 
the social posts of our friends, these advertisements, like the one in 
Figure 2, are often preceded by the names of our friends who have 
“liked” the advertiser’s page. For example, a statement like “Clara 
Oswald, Sarah Jane Smith, Martha Jones and 7 others like JCrew,” 
might appear at the top of a JCrew advertisement about the new Spring 
line. And “Alice, Barry, Catherine, and 22 others like Adidas” may 
appear above an advertisement for the newest Adidas running shoe. 
The information about our friends, not the advertisement, is the first 
thing we see. The only thing that distinguishes these advertisements 
from our friends’ social posts is the word “Sponsored,” written in light 
grey text under the name of the company and sandwiched between the 
advertisement’s much larger graphic content and Facebook’s bolded 
trust cue. 
These tactics exploit the relationship between particular social trust 
and the propensity to share: we are more likely to accept a “Friend 
Request” from someone with whom we share mutual friends, just like 
we are more likely to click on a link that our friends, especially our close 
friends, have also clicked. And when we do click on the link, we send 
data about our preferences to Facebook and its third party partners.  
B. Steps Forward 
 If they are accurate portrayals of our friends’ behavior, Face-
book’s notifications on social posts can cue trust and help us keep on 
top of social interaction. But when used to obscure the difference be-
tween social and commercial posts and between social interaction and 
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endorsement, exploiting the trust-sharing link can be deceitful and 
coercive. This problem can be solved in two different ways: changes in 
design or regulatory enforcement. Since platforms like Facebook may 
lack the incentives to change these design tactics,129 regulators, partic-
ularly the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state attorneys 
general,130 may need to start paying attention to how social platforms 
that collect user data deploy information they know about us and our 
friends. 
1. Privacy by Design 
Privacy by design is the notion that we should engineer our online 
platforms from the ground up with privacy in mind.131 As FTC Com-
missioner Julie Brill once noted, it involves “baking” user control over 
personal data into the underlying structure of a built online environ-
ment.132 This could include building databases with internal cyber-
security measures, incorporating privacy into everyday corporate 
practice, placing limits on data collection, and everything in between.133 
Facebook has a long way to go before it could be seen as a privacy-by-
design adopter. But it could start by designing its News Feed to be 
more transparent about native advertising. The word “sponsored,” 
which is confusing to many users,134 should be larger and more obvious, 
not obscured by a light-colored font and other, richer content. The 
Associated Press mobile application (Figure 3) is a good model. 
Standard news articles on the interface are in white text on a black 
background. A picture associated with the article is on the right; the 
headline is on the left. Sponsored posts not only reserve the positioning 
of the picture and headline, they are also prefaced by a bright yellow 
bar that reads “Paid for by . . .”. Furthermore, a “just in time” pop up  
129. Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
1409, 1436 (2011). 
130. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys 
General, Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7–8), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733297 (proposing 
that attorneys general should encourage laws that ban deceptive commercial 
acts). 
131. Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design 1 (2013), https://www.ipc.on.ca/ 
wp-content/uploads/Resources/pbd-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RAF-
G5YG] (“[Privacy by design] anticipates and prevents privacy invasive events 
before they happen.”). 
132. Julie Brill, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at W3C 
Meeting at 1 (Apr. 11, 2012), http:// www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/ 
120411w3cremarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7CA-QP69]. 
133. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era 
of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and 
Policymakers 44 (2010) (proposing a framework for how companies can 
protect consumer privacy). 
134. Wojdynski & Evans, supra note 12, at 162, 164–65. 
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privacy notification could notify users that a click on sponsored links 
will release some information to third parties. 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Federal Regulatory Responses 
Ultimately, privacy by design would require a change in culture at 
Facebook. The social network will likely neither adopt these mitigating 
design strategies nor voluntarily drop the practice of using trust cues 
on native advertisements. This leaves an opening for regulators. The 
FTC, which stepped into the role of de facto privacy regulator in the 
late 1990s pursuant to its authority in Section 5 of the FTC Act,135 and 
state attorneys general, arguably more active and more effective privacy 
 
135. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, 
are hereby declared unlawful.”). The FTC was given the authority to prevent 
such practices in subsection (a)(2). See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (“The 
Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent [others] . . . from 
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”). 
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regulators than the FTC,136 could step in.137 By taking users’ names and 
placing them on top of an advertisement in others’ News Feeds, 
Facebook takes advantage of everyday social interactions among 
persons. It then reframes these interactions as commercial endorsements 
in the same way and with the same design as trust cues on social posts. 
In so doing, Facebook is obscuring the difference between advertising 
and social spaces and manipulating users into sharing information with 
third parties.138 
This type of behavior is similar to unfair and deceitful design tactics 
that have previously been subject to FTC enforcement. As a threshold 
matter, it is clear that manipulative design can be regulated. In In re 
Sony BMG Music Entertainment,139 for example, Sony had designed its 
CDs to install digital rights management, or DRM,140 software on its 
users’ computers in such a way as to make it unreasonably difficult for 
users to remove or even know about it.141 Sony also designed its bundled 
media player to automatically send user information to Sony’s servers  
136. Citron, supra note 130 (manuscript at 37). 
137. As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have shown, the FTC’s authority 
to regulate unfair and deceptive practices is broad. Daniel J. Solove & 
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
Colum. L. Rev. 583, 585–86, 588 (2014). As the authors point out, the FTC 
has developed a broader view of unfair or deceptive practices, including, for 
example, “deception by omission,” “inducement” to share personal 
information, and “pretexting,” to name just a few. Id. at 630–33. Their 
persuasive argument is that “through a common law-like process, the FTC’s 
actions have developed into a rich jurisprudence that is effectively the law 
of the land for businesses that deal in personal information. . . . By clarifying 
its standards and looking beyond a company’s privacy promises, the FTC is 
poised to enforce a holistic and robust privacy regulatory regime that draws 
upon industry standards and consumer expectations of privacy . . . .” Id. at 
589. 
138. The plaintiffs made a similar argument, albeit without a full understanding 
of the role of trust in manipulating disclosure, in Fraley v. Facebook. See 
Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages at ¶¶ 32–35, Fraley 
v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2011) (No. 11–CV–
01726–LHK) (arguing that Facebook misleads its users regarding sharing 
information with companies). 
139. Complaint, Sony BMG Music Entm’t, F.T.C. File No. 062 3019, No. C-4195, 
2007 WL 1942983 (F.T.C. June 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sony Complaint]. 
140. DRM is a catch-all term for technological measures copyright owners use to 
control how their content is used and distributed. See Julie E. Cohen, DRM 
and Privacy, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 575, 575 (2003) (“In an effort to 
control the proliferation of unauthorized copies, and to maximize profit from 
information goods distributed over the Internet, copyright owners and their 
technology partners are designing digital rights management (‘DRM’) 
technologies that will allow more perfect control over access to and use of 
digital files.”). 
141. Sony Complaint, supra note 139, at ¶ 20. 
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to be used to targeted advertisements.142 Per the FTC’s complaint 
against Sony, these tactics constituted unfair design practices that 
misled, deceived, and constrained users.143 The FTC made a similar case 
for misleading design against Frostwire. Frostwire developed peer-to-
peer file sharing software that when downloaded onto a computer, 
automatically enabled other users on the network to search for files on 
that computer.144 But the interface included a “Frostwire Setup 
Wizard” that was designed to give users the impression that they could 
control which files could and could not be searchable.145 In reality, users 
had limited control. As the FTC noted, Frostwire had designed its 
software to, among other things, designate pre-existing files for sharing 
and make it extraordinarily difficult to opt out.146 
The FTC has also moved against companies that used design to 
deceive their users into handing over personal information. In FTC v. 
Hill,147 a particularly egregious case, the FTC argued that Hill engaged 
in a manipulative phishing scheme by designing fake websites to 
masquerade as AOL to trick people into disclosing log in and credit 
card information.148 Hill used AOL marks and logos and made the web-
site look like an AOL-affiliated page in all respects.149 
The elements of Facebook’s design that use trust to manipulate us 
into sharing information with advertisers suffer from the same faults 
underlying the Sony, Frostwire, and Hill actions. At the heart of the 
complaints were the FTC’s objections to designing a platform to not 
only to erode user privacy, but also to make it difficult for users to 
recapture control over the use of their data. Sony focused on manipula-
tive default settings. In addition to deceptive defaults, Frostwire 
challenged the design of an entire interface that made it seem like users 
 
142. Id. at ¶ 11. 
143. Id. at ¶ 21. See also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 137, at 642 (explaining 
instances where the FTC found website and software designs unfair). 
144. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3, FTC v. 
Frostwire, LLC. (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-23643), 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/112-3041/frostwire-llc-
angel-leon [https://perma.cc/HS2F-7VAZ] [hereinafter Frostwire Complaint]. 
145. Id. at 5–11. 
146. Id. at 13–14. 
147. FTC v. Hill (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2004) (No. 03-5537), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/03/040322cmp0323102.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EQ54-CBMS]. 
148. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 10–11, 
FTC v. Hill (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2004) (No. 03-5537), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/03/040322cmp0323102.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/EQ54-CBMS]. 
149. Id. at 5. 
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were erecting privacy controls when, in fact, they were being misled 
into a false sense of security. Hill involved using design to evoke trust 
and manipulate sharing. Facebook’s manipulative behavior may not be 
as overt as Hill’s, but the platform uses default settings and design to 
turn social interaction into endorsements and elicit sharing of personal 
information while keeping users in the dark. By leveraging trust among 
users to make advertisements look like social posts, Facebook leads its 
users into a false sense of trust and security when none exists. Its News 
Feed design, perhaps more subtly than the designs of Sony’s DRM, 
Frostwire’s P2P software, and Hill’s fake websites, still wrests control 
over personal data in a coercive, hidden way. 
3. State Attorneys General 
Attorneys at the FTC are not the only ones who could maneuver 
Facebook into redesigning its News Feed to remove trust cues from 
advertisements. As Danielle Citron argues, state attorneys general may 
actually be better equipped to protect personal privacy, in general.150 
They have cemented and changed privacy norms throughout the 
spectrum of privacy matters, including transparency of data use 
practices, data breach notification, giving consumers real choice, 
restricting what companies can do with data, and protecting and res-
pecting youth and sexual privacy.151 And they have considerable power 
and flexibility to limit Facebook’s and other platforms’ manipulation of 
trust to coerce users to share. 
Citron notes that state attorneys general are more nimble privacy 
enforcers: they are free of Byzantine federal bureaucracies, have large 
teams of lawyers with privacy expertise, and have a wider array of state 
privacy laws at their disposal.152 In particular, state attorneys general 
have several regulatory tools that may make them more effective 
privacy protectors than federal regulators. First, because they play a 
significant role in drafting state privacy legislation,153 state attorneys 
general could lead the charge to either apply existing laws to online 
platforms’ manipulation of trust or write new ones. 
 
150. Citron, supra note 130 (manuscript at 3–4). 
151. Id. (manuscript at 18–34). 
152. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
153. Citron notes that Delaware has adopted four privacy laws proposed by its 
attorney general, Matt Denn. Id. (manuscript at 12 n.54). And many state 
attorneys general have testified before federal committees concerning the 
adoption of federal privacy laws. See id. (manuscript at 12–13, 55 n.322) 
(stating that state attorneys general routinely testify before congressional 
committees). 
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Illinois, for example, already has a right of publicity statute that 
prohibits the use of a person’s name or photograph for the sale or adver-
tisement of goods or services without consent.154 It is that statute that 
encouraged a group of users of Groupon, a social e-commerce company 
that sells vouchers, or “Deals,” for discounts at participating businesses, 
restaurants, and other establishments, to challenge that company’s 
manipulation of trust. According to the complaint in the putative 
Groupon class action, each Deal has its own webpage, which includes 
the name, location, and description of the participating business, the 
terms of the offer, and several photographs of the establishment 
provided by the business.155 At times, Groupon has also included pic-
tures of consumers who were ostensibly at the location.156 But rather 
than asking consumers or the participating business for these photos, 
Groupon allegedly scraped them from Instagram’s application pro-
gramming interface by making a request for Instagram photos “tagged” 
with the name of the business in the Deal.157 In other words, Groupon 
asked Instagram for all photos that were taken at the business’s location 
and included them on its Deal page. Setting aside the fact that, if true, 
Groupon violated Instagram’s Platform Policy,158 it is likely that 
Groupon included the photos to suggest to consumers that all of the 
individuals had already purchased the Deal, enjoyed themselves, and 
now endorse the business or product.159 Groupon also placed the photos 
next to the Deal’s “Tips” section, where actual Groupon users who had 
purchased the Deal provided feedback, thus suggesting that the 
individuals in the Instagram photos did, as well. If these allegations 
prove true, Groupon would appear to be taking advantage of the fact 
that individuals tend to share personal information online based on 
indicia of particular social trust. Its tactics deceive and manipulate 
users into thinking the Deal is trustworthy when, in fact, it might not 
be. 
 
154. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 1075/30(a) (West 2016). 
155. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Dancel v. Groupon, 
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. Feb. 5, 2016) (No. 2016CH01716), 2016 WL 464011 
(hereinafter, “Groupon Complaint”). 
156. Id. at 5. 
157. Id. at 5–6. 
158. Platform Policy, Instagram https://www.instagram.com/about/legal/ 
terms/api/ [https://perma.cc/Z3CV-XQN3] (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) 
(stating that API users must “[o]btain a person’s consent before including 
their User Content in any ad”). See also Does Instagram Let Advertisers 
Use My Photos or Videos?, Instagram, https://help.instagram.com 
/206875879493855 [https://perma.cc/2FWY-K4FF] (last visited Apr. 4, 
2016) (“No. You own your own photos and videos. Advertising on Instagram 
doesn’t change this.”). 
159. Groupon Complaint, supra note 155, at 6–7. 
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Facebook’s manipulation may be subtler, but it is no less deceptive. 
Both Groupon and Facebook know that we share when we trust. That 
may not be a bad thing when we are talking about creating dynamic 
social spaces. But it raises significant privacy concerns when our 
information is being shared with third parties that are both strangers 
to us and our privacy settings. State attorneys general may be able to 
address those concerns through legislation and associated litigation.160 
Another weapon in the hands of state attorneys general is persua-
sion, a tool used most effectively to protect privacy by California 
Attorney General Kamala Harris.161 AG Harris has convened task forces 
with business leaders, come to informal business agreements with 
technology companies from Google to Yahoo to Facebook, and issued 
extensive best practice guides to help flesh out state statutory require-
ments.162 And industries often have significant incentives to comply: 
adherence to agreements negotiated in good faith stave off expensive 
lawsuits that destroy good will with policymakers and damage user 
confidence.163 Similar guidance on appropriate and inappropriate uses 
of trust cues on social networks—social posts versus native 
advertisements—and on how to design native advertisements to suffici-
ently contrast with the balance of the platform could help nudge Face-
book to change its ways.164  
160. See Citron, supra note 130 (manuscript at 15) (identifying “litigation” as 
another weapon for state attorneys general to use to protect privacy). 
161. Citron reports on several other state attorneys general, including those in 
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, who have used task forces and 
best practice guides to cajole companies into protecting privacy, but 
Attorney General Harris has been a pioneering leader. Id. (manuscript at 
13–14). 
162. Id. (manuscript at 30–31). AG Harris’s Privacy on the Go: 
Recommendations for the Mobile Ecosystem, a guide for app developers and 
platform providers to provide mobile app users with adequate privacy 
protections, and Making Your Privacy Practices Public, a practice guide on 
California’s Online Privacy Protection Act, are particularly notable 
examples. Kamala D. Harris, Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, 
Privacy on the Go: Recommendations for the Mobile Ecosystem 
(2013), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_ 
the_go.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BHK-WVS2]; Kamala D. Harris, Att’y 
Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Making Your Privacy Practices 
Public (2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity 
/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6HW-
F45H]. 
163. See Citron, supra note 130 (manuscript at 16) (explaining the incentives 
companies have to follow relevant regulatory standards). 
164. Notably, the FTC has already issued native advertising guidance. E.g., 
Native Advertising: A Guide for Businesses, Fed. Trade Comm’n (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/native-
advertising-guide-businesses [https://perma.cc/UN3U-894A]. Evidence of 
their success is mixed, at best. State attorneys general, given their strong 
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Conclusion 
This Article has presented data suggesting that we share when we 
trust. In particular, we tend to be more willing to share information 
online when we know that our friends have also shared similar infor-
mation. This confirms and extends the current social science research 
on the propensity to share. Scholars have shown that, with respect to 
e-commerce websites, higher levels of trust in the website translate into 
a greater willingness to share. Previous studies have also shown that 
sharing decisions are contextual and, in particular, heavily influenced 
by the knowledge that other users have shared. This research suggests 
that sharing is indeed contextual and is particularly influenced by users’ 
trust in others they know well. It adds to our understanding of trust 
and sharing by suggesting that the relationship holds for social 
networking websites and by highlighting the importance of trusted 
users in our decisions to share. 
That a user’s propensity to share can be nudged by creating a 
community of sharers that a user trusts explains why Facebook notifies 
its users about their friends’ likes, dislikes, and online activity. These 
nudges may enhance user experiences online because they are roughly 
equivalent to personal recommendations from trusted sources. But they 
can be used to coerce, mislead, and deceive users, as well. Given that 
the connection between particular social trust and the propensity to 
share has been underappreciated to date, misuse of social network data 
has escaped privacy regulation. This research, then, opens up a new 
path for the FTC and state attorneys general to protect consumers from 
the online misuse of their information. 
 
history in setting privacy norms, need to step in to ensure compliance with 
substantive and design requirements over native advertisements. 
